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Abstract 
It is usually accepted that the binding of What, Where, and When is a central component 
of young children’s and animals’ non-conceptual episodic abilities. We argue that 
additionally binding self-in-past (What-Where-When-Who) adds a crucial conceptual 
requirement, and ask when this becomes possible and what are its cognitive correlates.  In 
the central task children between 3.5 and 6.5 years of age watched a light display on day-
1, with two lights coming on simultaneously or in one of two orders.  This was filmed 
from one of three positions: camera behind child, above child, and facing child. On day-2 
children watched three videos from the original angle, each of which represented one of 
the three light configurations, and with the child in the video occluded. Participants had 
to decide which occluded child was them and justify their choice by reference to the 
lights.  Above-chance performance was evident after 4.5- years. In addition, all children 
received the following tasks: spatial perspective-taking, seeing-leads-to-knowing, Modus 
Tollens reasoning, and second-order theory of mind.  With age and verbal ability 
partialled out, only second-order theory of mind correlated significantly with 
performance on the central task. 
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Episodic memory is the conscious, re-experiential memory for autobiographical events. It 
can be viewed within cognitive development as something that depends upon the 
possession of certain concepts (such as theory of mind and causal insights into how 
experience causes memory: Perner, 2001), and as developing after 4 years (Perner & 
Ruffman, 1995).  Alternatively it can be viewed as something more cognitively minimal 
and as essentially spatiotemporal (Russell & Hanna, 2012), with this form of episodic 
memory being found in children well under 4 years (Burns, Russell & Russell, 2014; 
Newcombe et al, 2014). 
 
In fact, Endel Tulving’s original definition of episodic memory was a minimalist, 
spatiotemporal one that made no explicit reference to conceptual abilities: “Episodic 
memory receives and stores information about temporally dated episodes or events, and 
temporal-spatial relations among these events” (Tulving, 1972, p. 385).  Because of its 
minimalist nature, this definition has inspired research on forms of episodic memory in 
both animals and young children. While these two kinds of research differ in many 
respects, they hold the common assumption that minimal episodic memory is a form of 
“What-Where-When” memory. This paper focuses on what has to be added to children’s 
What-Where-When memory through development so that it becomes a more conceptual 
and self-knowing kind of memory comparable to that of adults. 
 
 The What-Where-When shorthand in animal (Babb and Crystal, 2005; Clayton & 
Dickinson, 1998; Eacott and Norman, 2004; Iordanova, Good, and Honey, 2008) and 
developmental (Hayne & Imuta, 2011; Newcombe, Balcomb, Ferrara, Hansen, and 
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Koski, 2014) research means that episodic recall minimally depends upon binding 
spatiotemporal content (Where and When) to semantic content (What: an object or 
action). One immediate interpretive difficulty with this designation is that  “temporal” 
can mean a number of different things.  For example, does “temporal” mean how long 
ago the event took place (as in Clayton & Dickinson, 1998), the simultaneously present 
context of testing (as in Eacott and Norman, 2004; Newcombe et al, 2014), the day of the 
event (as in Iordanova et al., 2014), or the order in which locations were visited (as in 
Hayne & Imuta, 2011)? 
 
 In a recent deferred-imitation study with 2- and 3-year-old children, Burns, 
Russell, and Russell (2014) answered the question about the temporal element in the 
following way. “Temporal” should refer to the order or simultaneity of elements within 
the event, given that, as originally argued by Kant (1781/1998), the spatial content of the 
original experience will necessarily take this form. Using this criterion, we found 
evidence for a form of episodic WWW memory in 2- and 3-year-olds. 
 
 However, Burns et al used the term “proto-episodic” rather than “episodic” to 
designate the kind of memory displayed by the children. Reflection on the reasons for 
doing this will establish the rationale for the present study.  In our experiment, the 
children had to recall, by re-enacting, the order (When) in which two levers where 
manipulated, the location of the relevant levers (Where on a box), and What kind of 
actions (pumping or twirling) that had to be performed.  Overall, the children achieved 
this binding and their memory had an holistic character, with recall tending to be all-or-
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nothing rather than fragmentary.  There was, however, no reason to believe that they did 
all this knowingly.    
 
That is to say, while the sight of the materials on the second day may have revived the 
experience of the experimenter’s demonstration on the previous day (in perhaps a 
“flashback”-like way) there was no reason to believe that the children were 
demonstrating the following five kinds of conceptual ability that might be said to be the 
hallmarks of mature episodic memory:  
(1) Conceptualising the recollected event as a unique temporal locus in a sequence of 
events causally related to the recollected event (see Campbell, 1993; Hoerl, 2001; 
McCormack & Hoerl, 2001);  
(2) Intentionally casting their minds back to the previous day to report what happened, 
employing a cognitive agency that can be exercised additionally towards the future, 
sometimes called “mental time travel” (after Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997);   
(3) Construing their re-experiential memories in the following light: as the re-experience 
at time-2 of an original experience at time-1, thereby amounting to metarepresentation 
(Perner, 2001);  
(4) Regarding the experience at time-1 as causing the memory at time-2 (Perner, 2001); 
(5) Conceptualising themselves in the past as experiencers of the original event in a 
certain physical situation –– “revisiting” themselves in the past as witnesses to the 
original demonstration.  
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Christoph Hoerl describes the significance of this last form of understanding in the 
following terms: “the causal understanding involved in episodic memory consists in a 
grasp of certain spatiotemporal constraints on remembering, that is, of the fact that we 
must have been around to witness an event before we can remember it.” (2001, p. 333; 
emphasis added).  
 
 The above five conceptualisations-cum-abilities are gathered together by Tulving 
(2005) under the term “autonoesis,” a coining that captures the necessity for the episodic 
recollector doing what she is doing with full self-knowledge.  In this paper we focus on 
the “auto-” aspect  –– the conceptualisation of self-in-the-past –– because this (the fifth 
above) conceptual ability would seem to underpin the other four. That is to say, thinking 
back to oneself as being in a certain situation yesterday would seem to subsume within it 
the following kinds of knowledge and ability: (1) regarding the past event as unique; (2) 
casting the mind back intentionally; (3) thinking of oneself as re-experiencing an earlier 
experience (metarepresentation); (4) regarding what one witnessed in the earlier situation 
as causing the present memory. 
 
 Given the generally-agreed centrality of spatiotemporal experience to episodic 
memory, as highlighted most recently in the Burns et al study, we decided to investigate 
the child’s ability to identify him or herself in the past (on a video record) by the use of 
spatiotemporal cues (simultaneity and order), which gives rise to the binding of the What-
Where-When-Who of our title.  
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 When do children manifest the kinds of conceptual abilities listed above, and 
what is the evidence that they are related to episodic memorial abilities?  Taking free 
(versus cued) recall of coloured pictures as the measure of episodic recall Perner and 
Ruffman (1995) have shown that, when age and verbal ability are partialled out, there is a 
significant correlation with tests of understanding how earlier experiences determine later 
knowledge, which taps ability (4) above.  When direct (versus indirect) exposure to test 
materials is the measure of episodic memory similar results are found (Perner, Kloo & 
Gornik, 2007).  However, turning to ability (3) –– metarepresentation ––no evidence has 
emerged to date of a relation between first-order theory of mind as assessed by tasks such 
as unexpected transfer (Wimmer & Perner, 1983) and episodic recollection (Naito, 2003; 
Perner, Kloo & Stöttinger, 2007). The age of the children who are able to both perform 
well on the episodic tasks and pass the correlative cognitive tasks is 4 years or over.  
 
The age of 4 years also emerged as a transitional age in a study by Scarf, Cross, 
Colombo, and Hayne (2013).  In this, a “spoon test” (Tulving, 2005) methodology was 
employed as an index of the episodic recall of a single event: children had to select a key 
to open a locked box they had found previously.  Because such a task required the 
exercise of the “cognitive agency” mentioned in ability (2) –– casting the mind back to an 
event without perceptual reminders of it (in the service of an inference) –– we would 
class it as a conceptual test of episodic memory, as opposed to the proto-episodic 
memory tapped in Burns et al (2014).  The authors found, however, that when the delay 
between target event and item selection was short, and certainly under 24 hours, that 
many 3 year olds succeeded.  This performance profile may have been due to the transfer 
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of the day-time event-memories from the hippocampus to neocortical regions during 
sleep (Burgess et al, 2001) in the older children.  The younger children may have been 
failing to transfer the information overnight into long-term memory.  
 
Age-of-acquisition issues also surround the ability to recognise oneself in the past from a 
video record which, as mentioned above, was a central requirement of our study. The 
seminal work on this topic has been carried out by Povinelli. Once again, the age of 4 is a 
transitional age. After 4 years children can appreciate the continuity between video-self 
and current self (Povinelli, Landau & Perilloux, 1996).  Additionally, when children as 
young as 3 years are presented with videos of themselves in the past, they are able to self-
recognise verbally (though often referring to themselves in the third person), whilst being 
challenged by the requirement to work out how the hiding event they saw in the self-
including video determined the current state of the world (Povinelli et al, 1999). 
 
The Central Task 
In essence, the children  (3.5-6.5 years) were required to decide, on day-2, whether they 
themselves or another child was present in a video of a visit to the lab on the previous 
day. The child in the video was occluded, and the only cues to identification that the 
video afforded were the spatiotemporal ones of whether a pair of lights the child in the 
video could see were coming on simultaneously, or left-before-right (LR), or right before 
left (RL).  For example, if the child in the video was looking at simultaneous lights, and 
the child in the experiment could recall herself seeing the lights coming on successively, 
then the video could not be showing her. 
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 We will refer to this task as “the jungle task” because, in order to engage the 
children, the lights were presented as “trees” in a “jungle.” 
 
 Given this procedure, it is clear that a child could fail the task simply because she 
had forgotten the light sequence she had seen.  We felt, however, that explicit tests for 
sequence memory would fatally influence the measure of interest (use of spatiotemporal 
cues to self-identify), for the following reasons.  First, giving a memory test before the 
test question would be sure to affect the answer given to the test question. Similarly, 
giving the memory test after the test question would be uninformative, as the child’s 
answer to the test question would constrain the response to the memory question.  In 
addition, a memory check on day-1, after the initial demonstration, was not used as 
asking the self-identification question on day-2 could be contaminated by whatever 
memory the child had of the memory-check itself on day one. A virtue can be made out 
of this necessity, however, as it resulted in no cues being provided to encourage the use 
the spatiotemporal information in self-identification, so we obtain a relatively pure 
measure of the spontaneous use of such cues ––something more relevant to children’s 
everyday experience. 
 
To avoid false positives from correct guessing we asked children to justify their answers; 
and these had to make reference to the light sequences. A further reason for requesting 
justifications was that we wished to tap children’s explicit rather than intuitive 
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understanding of how their choice was determined: autonoesis rather than simple 
memory.  
 
 We made the video recording on day-1 from one of three positions: behind the 
child, from the ceiling, and facing the child on the opposite side of the room. Given this, 
only in the first (behind) case could the video record provide a familiar image of the 
event.  We will discuss the role of camera positions later; but prima facie the camera-
behind condition would seem, at least, to be easier given that the child is being presented 
with a scene that should look familiar, as it is an image of the original experience. 
 
 To pass the task then, children had to identify the video that contained the 
arrangement of lights to which they had been exposed, in addition to justifying their 
choice with reference to the lights. 
 
Ancillary Tasks 
In addition to determining when children can spontaneously use past spatiotemporal cues 
to self-identify we wished to find out what were the cognitive correlates of this ability.  
To this end we gave children four further tasks, in addition to a test of verbal ability. We 
now present the tasks and their rationales. 
 
Modus Tollens 
Making a correct video choice in the self-identification task requires the following kind 
of inference: “If it is me in the video then there will be left-right lights shown, there were 
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simultaneous lights, so this cannot be me.”  This inference takes the form If p then q, ~q, 
therefore ~p, which is Modus Tollens.  
 
Coding Spatial Experience In Terms Of One’s Location 
Success on the task would also seem to depend on the child’s ability to reason about the 
location of objects in relation to an observer at different locations.  We adapted a task 
used by Newcombe and Huttenlocher (1992) to this end. 
 
Second-Order Metarepresentation 
As mentioned above, no evidence has emerged of to date for a linkage between episodic 
memory development and performance on classical metarepresentation tasks like the 
unexpected transfer task for false belief understanding (Naito, 2003; Perner et al, 2007).  
But in fact success on the self-identification task would seem to require not only 
metarepresentational ability (as in representing at time-2 what was experienced at time-1; 
e.g., simultaneous lights) but second-order metarepresentational ability, namely, 
representing a representation at time-2 of one’s mental representation of simultaneous 
lights at time-1). Accordingly, we presented children with a task based on Perner and 
Howes (1992) in which children had to embed one propositional attitude within another.  
 
Seeing Leads To Knowing: Causal Knowledge 
Recall that one of the five kinds of conceptual appreciation discussed above (number 4) 
was one involving the knowledge that the experience at time-1 was the cause of the re-
experiential memory at time-2. In tasks assessing this children have to say whether they 
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knew or guessed the location of a toy.  Perner and Ruffman (1995; though see Drummy 
& Newcombe, 2002, for somewhat conflicting data) found a correlation between episodic 
memory (assessed by free recall for pictures) and understanding that knowing something 
at time-2 depends upon have experienced (told or seen) something at time-1.  We 
presented children with these “see-know” tasks based on Perner’s procedures. 
 
Our two central questions for this study were then: (1) When do children become capable 
of passing an episodic recollection task in which there must be explicit representation of 
self-in-past? (2) What kinds of conceptual abilities seem to be underpinning this ability?  
We tested children between 3.5 and 6.5 years. 
 
METHOD 
Participants 
We tested 166 children (85 female) between the ages of 3.5 and 6.5 years of age.  
Thirteen children were removed from the final sample either because a parent or an older 
sibling interfered with experimental protocol or because the child refused to participate in 
one of the tasks. The final sample consisted of 153 children, 51 between the age 3.5 and 
4.5 years (M = 48 months), 51 between the age 4.5 and 5.5 years (M = 58 months) and 51 
between the age 5.5 and 6.5 years (M = 74 months). These age-bands will be referred to 
henceforth as “young,” “middle,” and “old.” A third of the children (n =17) in each age-
band were randomly assigned to one of the three conditions. Children were recruited via 
leafleting and posters in schools and children’s centres in Cambridge, UK. The SES of 
the children was predominantly middle class. 
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Apparatus 
A playroom in the laboratory was employed as the “jungle room.” The room was 
decorated with potted plants and soft toys to give the impression of a jungle (see Figures 
1 and 2). In the centre of the room there were two identical light towers (schematic 
“trees”). They were cuboid in shape and measured 1ft x 1ft around and 4ft in height. The 
base of each tower was painted green while the top part consisted of an opaque plastic 
cover underneath which there was a red light. There was a small chair in the room for 
children to sit on and two larger chairs against a side wall on which parents could 
observe. In the centre of the room, 2.5 feet apart, stood the two light towers. The chair the 
child sat in was placed 5ft in front of the light towers. In the camera-behind and camera-
facing conditions a Panasonic camcorder was used to record the child’s visit. The 
camcorder was positioned on a tripod either directly behind the child’s seat in the 
camera-behind condition, or facing the child on the far side of the room, 5ft from the 
light towers, in the camera-facing condition. The height of the camcorder was fixed at 
just above the child’s seated head-height. For the camera-above condition the ceiling-
mounted camera was above the towers and recorded an image of the whole room.  
 
Design And General Procedure 
In addition to age, the between-subject factors were (a) camera position and (b) the 
temporal order of the lights (simultaneous, left-before-right, or right-before left).  
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See Figure 1.With regards to (a), in the camera-behind condition, the camera recorded the 
episode from the same perspective as that of the child. In the camera-above condition a 
ceiling camera recorded the episode from above (90° rotation upward from the child’s 
perspective) and in the camera-facing condition a camera recorded the scene from the 
opposite side of the room from where the child was positioned (180° rotation from the 
child’s perspective). Note that in the camera-above condition there was congruence 
between the child’s left-right experiences and the camera record, despite the fact that the 
views were different. Accordingly, what was, say, left to the child in the jungle visit was 
left on the camera-above clip. 
 
The two light towers (“ trees”) were placed in the centre of the room, surrounded by 
plants and stuffed animals. (The latter changed position from child to child, depending on 
what happened in the free-play session –– see below.) The child sat facing the towers, 
equidistant from them such that one tower was in the child’s left field of vision and one 
tower was in the child’s right field of vision (see Figure 1). The focal event was the light 
display that accompanied the monkey calls. Children either saw the left light come on for 
5 seconds after which there was a pause of one second before the other light came on for 
5 seconds. Alternatively, they saw the right light come on first followed by the left light. 
Or, thirdly, they saw both lights come on simultaneously for 5 seconds.   
 
 On day-2 children were shown 3 video clips of the jungle visit, each one taken 
from the camera position of the experimental condition to which the child had been 
assigned. A piece of blank card was placed over the screen, occluding the child present in 
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the video.  In fact, there was no child present in any of the three video clips as they were 
shot immediately after children’s visit on day 1 was completed. The 3 clips were identical 
except for the spatiotemporal content of the light sequences. The video clips were played 
without sound. Children selected the video in which they thought that they were present. 
Having selected one of the three videos in response to the choice question, children were 
then asked why they had made that choice. Responses to the justification question were 
categorised as either a correct or incorrect justification. Children were credited with 
giving a correct justification if they made reference to the temporal order of the lights. 
Examples of correct justifications were, “Because that one went on first” (pointing to one 
of the lights), and “Because the two lights came on at the same time”.  Incorrect 
justifications made no reference to the temporal sequence of the lights: for example, “Just 
know”, “It had the monkeys in it” and “Because the lights were that colour”. Including a 
justification of the choice limited the influence that picking the correct video by chance1 
could have on the data.  
 
 Children completed 5 further tasks (described below): second-order mental state 
attribution (Perner & Howes, 1992); visual perspective taking  (Newcombe & 
Huttenlocher, 1992); know-guess (Perner & Ruffman, 1995); Modus Tollens reasoning 
(modelled on McCormack, et al, 2013); British Picture Vocabulary Scale 1st edition 
(BPVS). Two of the tasks were administered on day-1 after children had visited the 
jungle and the remaining three tasks were administered on day-2 after the children had 
                                                 
1 For example, if 50% of the children selected the wrong video and if we assume that these children chose 
randomly from the three options, with a chance of 0.66 of being wrong then we can estimate that 
approximately 25% of the whole group selected the correct video by chance (given that the chance of a 
correct guess, 0.33, half of 0.66). 
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watched the video clips of the jungle visit. The tasks were administered in a randomized 
order with the exception of the BPVS, which was always administered last.  
 
Narrative Procedure For The Central And Ancillary Tasks  
When children arrived they were told that they were going to visit a pretend jungle where 
they would play a game in which they had to identify various animals from the calls they 
made. They were told about a special animal noise that they had to listen out for: that of 
the monkey. The experimenter also told children that when the monkey calls were heard 
“something special will happen,” though he “wasn’t sure what kind of special thing 
would happen.” The experimenter then brought children accompanied by their 
parent/caregiver to the jungle room. After some warm-up play with the toy animals the 
main game began. The experimenter first introduced the camera to children, telling them 
“We will make a video of our trip to the jungle so that tomorrow we can watch the video 
and see ourselves playing in the jungle.” The experimenter then turned on the video. In 
the camera-behind and camera-facing conditions the camera was placed on a tripod and 
the child was invited to look through the viewfinder and asked if he or she could see the 
jungle trees and the experimenter (who positioned himself in front of the camera). In the 
camera-above condition the child was brought into an observation room adjacent to the 
lab (behind a wall to the right of the child’s seat in Figure 1) where the video equipment 
for the ceiling camera was located. The experimenter pointed out on the monitor the 
jungle trees and the small chair where the child would be seated. The experimenter then 
went back into the jungle and waved into the camera (as in the camera-facing and 
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camera-behind condition) and asked the child to verify that he or she could see him on 
the monitor.  
 
The child then returned to the seat in the jungle to begin the game. Two recordings of 
animal noises were played: first an elephant and then a parrot. Children were given clues 
if they failed to identify either animal. The third animal noise played was that of the 
monkey. Children were asked prior to the monkey call if they could remember which 
animal was the special one that they had to listen out for, and were given a reminder if 
they could not remember. The monkey recording played in exact synchrony with the 
lighting of the “tree” towers. Once the display had finished the experimenter asked the 
child whether he or she had seen the lights and commented on how surprising it was. The 
experimenter then told the child that he thought that was all the animals they would hear. 
He switched off the camera while reminding children that they would be able to watch 
the video tomorrow. The experimenter, child and caregiver then moved to a separate 
room were they completed two other tests. 
 
Children and caregivers returned approximately 24hrs later. The experimenter reminded 
children that the day before they had visited the jungle and that the experimenter had 
made a video. The experimenter then told the child that he was going to show them a 
video clip from their visit to the jungle the previous day together with two clips from the 
visits of other children. They had to pick the video clip in which they were present. The 
videos were presented on a 14-inch laptop screen. A card was placed in front of the 
portion of screen where a child would be. The order in which the three videos were 
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shown to children was counterbalanced. In each condition, before the first video was 
played the experimenter pointed out the jungle trees and the ‘jungle lights’ to children. 
Children were also told that someone was sitting in a little chair behind the card and that 
it might be them but it might be someone else. The experimenter then played the video 
clip, which began just before the monkey call commenced and finished just after the 
monkey call finished. When all three clips had been viewed the experimenter asked 
children, “Which one of these three video clips is our video?” If children gave no 
response they were asked whether they wanted to see the videos again. They were then 
shown the 3 video clips in the same order with the same instructions, after which the test 
question was put to them again. If they did not reply to the test question after further 
encouragement, they were recorded as giving no response. When children selected a 
video clip the experimenter replayed the clip, asked children whether they thought this 
was the right one and then asked children why they thought this was the right video. 
Children were then shown the entire film of their own visit to the jungle. Children then 
completed the remaining tasks. The procedures for each of the 5 ancillary tasks are 
described below. 
 
Second-order mental state attribution (after Perner & Howes, 1992): Children were told a 
story, illustrated with pictures, about a boy who received a new toy train from his mother. 
After playing with his train, he left it on the table in his bedroom and then went to the 
park to play with his friend. While he was in the park his mother came into to his room to 
tidy up. She saw the train on the table and she moved it to a box on the shelves. Children 
were asked two control questions: “Where did Charlie [the boy] leave his train?” and 
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“Where is his train now?” They were then asked the second-order mental state attribution 
question in which giving the correct answer requires the child to appreciate that the 
protagonist thinks he knows where the train is.  They were told to imagine going to the 
park and meeting Charlie so they could ask him: “Charlie, do you know where your train 
is? What will Charlie say? Will he say, ‘I do know where my train is or will he say ‘I 
don’t know where my train is?” Once they had made a response children were then asked 
why they thought Charlie would say that. Answers to the why-question were coded as 
appropriate if they made reference to Charlie’s mental state, “He thinks it is on the table”, 
or if they made reference to Charlie’s leaving the toy at a particular location, “Because he 
left his train on the table”. Inappropriate justifications were those that referred to the toy’s 
current location, “Because the toy is in the box”. As a final check, children were asked a 
first-order false belief question, “Where will Charlie look for his train when he goes back 
home?” Children who gave an inappropriate justification and/or answered the first-order 
false belief question incorrectly were categorised as failing the task. Those who answered 
the second-order mental state attribution question correctly, gave an appropriate 
justification and answered the first-order false belief question correctly were categorised 
as passing the task. 
 
Visual perspective taking (after Newcombe & Huttenlocher, 1992): Children sat at one 
side of a small square table (notional North) in a yellow chair. The experimenter sat at the 
notional West side of the table. On the South side directly opposite the child there was a 
red chair. The experimenter and child each put on a single glove (the child chose left or 
right with the experimenter copying the child’s choice). The gloves were used because 
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young children struggle with the terms “left” and “right.” The experimenter then 
introduced four coloured blocks, placing one at each side of the table. Children placed 
their hands on the table in front of the East and West blocks. The experimenter then 
labelled the blocks’ location for the child: “The yellow block is right in front of you. The 
red block is far away from you. The blue block is by your hand with a glove and the 
green block is by your hand without a glove.” Children were then asked four control 
questions, such as “Which block is right in front of you?” and so forth.  If they answered 
any incorrectly they were then reminded of each block’s location and then the four 
control questions were repeated. Before the test questions were asked they were told to 
pretend that they were sitting in the red chair. They were then asked four test questions 
presented in conditional form, “If you were sitting in the red chair, which block would be 
right in front of you / far away from you / by your hand with a glove / by your hand 
without a glove?” The experimenter held his glove-hand or non-glove-hand up in front of 
his face while asking those questions. Children were given a score out of four. 
 
 Know-guess task (after Perner & Ruffman, 1995): Two boxes, one red and one 
blue, a toy horse and a screen were used. The experimenter told the child that he would 
put the horse in one of the 2 boxes and that their task was to then find it. There were three 
types of trial: (1) a ‘see-know’ trial in which the boxes were positioned in front of the 
screen in full view of the child such that the child could see in which box the horse has 
been placed; (2) a ‘hear-know’ trial in which the boxes are positioned behind the screen 
but the experimenter told the child in which box the horse has been placed; (3) an 
‘ignorance’ trial in which the boxes were positioned behind the screen but the child was 
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not told in which box the horse had been placed. Each trial was completed twice. The 
ignorance trials were rigged such that on one the child was sure to select a box containing 
the horse (both boxes contained a horse) and on one the child was sure to select the box 
without a horse (neither contained a horse). Children were asked which box contained the 
horse. Once they had selected a box and it was opened they are they were asked the test 
question: “When I asked where the horse was, did you know the horse was in this box or 
did you guess?” On the ignorance-correct trial, children who claimed they knew the 
location of the horse were asked a follow-up question: “How did you know the horse was 
in the red/blue box?” Responses were scored in the following manner. Children were 
given a score of 2 for correctly asserting that they knew where the horse was on the 
‘know’ trials and guessed which box the horse was placed in on the ignorance trials. 
Children were given a score of 1 for claiming they had known where the horse was on the 
ignorance-correct trial while appropriately selecting guess on the ignorance-incorrect 
trials and know for the remaining know-trials. However, if on follow-up questioning, 
children gave a plausible reason for claiming that they knew where the horse was on the 
ignorance-correct trial then they were given a score of 1.5. (Plausible reasons included 
inferring the location of the horse from the pattern of previous hiding places, e.g., “I 
knew it was going to be red this time because you put it was in blue the last two times”, 
and by careful observation, “I saw your hand move to that one”). Finally, children were 
given a score of 0 for responding ‘know’ or ‘guess’ to all test questions or for selecting 
know and guess without any discernible pattern. 
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 Modus Tollens (modelled on McCormack et al., 2013): Children were presented 
with two tests of Modus Tollens reasoning. On the “card” test children were shown an 
envelope and told that it contained some cards. The experimenter told children that some 
of the cards were red and some were blue (withdrawing one card of each colour to 
demonstrate and then placing them to one side). The experimenter then told children that 
there was a special rule with the blue cards: “If the card is blue then there is a picture of a 
teddy bear on the other side”. The experimenter then withdrew a blue card and asked the 
child what is on the other side. They were reminded of the special rule if they did not 
give the correct response. When they gave the correct response the card was turned over 
to reveal the picture. The experimenter repeated this with another blue card and then on 
the critical trial the experimenter withdrew a card with a picture of a cat (~q ) on it. The 
experimenter then asked the test question: “Is this a blue card or is this a red card?” The 
“box” test was identical except that it involved black boxes that were either yellow or 
green underneath. Green boxes contained marbles. On the critical trial a box is opened to 
reveal a crayon (~q) and children were asked whether it is a green or yellow box. Scoring 
ranged from 0-2.  
 
RESULTS  
Performance On The Jungle Task  
In analysing performance on the jungle task we used two outcome measures: (1) 
children’s choice of video and (2) video choice plus children’s justifications of their 
choices (a selection of these justification is shown in an appendix).  Table 1 presents the 
percentages of children, across age-group and camera position, selecting the correct 
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video. In parenthesis are the percentages of children selecting the correct video and also 
giving an appropriate justification for their choice. Table 2 presents the percentage of 
correct video selections (and video selections with appropriate justifications in 
parenthesis) across age group and light display order. We did not combine the data from 
Tables 1 and 2 into a single analysis as this would have resulted in cell sizes too small to 
make for meaningful analysis. 
 
We first examined the effect that age-group and camera position had on correct video 
choice, without taking justifications into account. We conducted a loglinear analysis to 
examine the 3-way interaction of age-group (young vs. middle vs. old), camera position 
condition and outcome (pass/fail) and all lower order effects and interactions (age-group 
x position; age-group x outcome; position x outcome; age-group; position; outcome). The 
final model only retained the effect of age-group by outcome. The likelihood ratio of this 
model was 2 (12) = 4.59, p = .97, indicating that this model was a good fit for the data. 
The 2-way interaction term of camera position by outcome was not retained, indicating 
that camera viewing position, unlike age, had no reliable effect on correct video choice.  
 
To explore this effect of age on performance we conducted three chi square analyses. 
There was a significant difference in the proportion of young and middle age-group 
children who selected the correct video, 2 (1) = 7.02, p < .01. There was also a 
significant difference in the proportion of young and oldest age-group children who 
selected the correct video, 2 (1) = 13.02, p < .01. There was no significant difference in 
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the proportion of middle and oldest age-group who selected the correct video, 2 (1) = 
1.06, p = .3.  
 
We next examined the effect that age and camera position had on correct video choices 
with justifications. A loglinear analysis examined the 3-way interaction of age-group, 
camera condition and correct response with justification, along with each of the lower-
order interactions and effects. The final model retained the effect of age by correct 
response-with-justification. The likelihood ratio of this model was 2 (12) = 7.72, p = .81, 
indicating that this model was a good fit for the data. That the 2-way interaction term of 
condition by correct response with justification was not retained indicates that camera 
position had no effect on this measure of performance. 
 
The interaction of age by correct response-with-justification was explored with 3 chi-
square analyses. The proportion of middle age-group children who gave a correct 
response with a justification was greater than the proportion of younger age group 
children, 2 (1) = 5.45, p < .05. Likewise, the proportion of older age-group children who 
gave a correct response with a justification was significantly greater than the proportion 
of middle age-group children, 2 (1) = 3.97, p < .05. Lastly, the proportion of older age-
group children giving correct responses with appropriate justification was significantly 
greater than the proportion of younger age-group children doing so, 2 (1) = 17.49, p < 
.01.  
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We next examined the effect that age and light display type had on correct video choice, 
discounting justifications. A loglinear analysis examined the 3-way interaction of age-
group by light display type (left-right/simultaneous/right-left) by outcome (pass/fail) and 
each of the lower type interactions and effects. The final model retained the interaction of 
age by outcome only. The likelihood ratio of this model was 2 (12) = 14.02, p = .3, 
indicating that this model was a good fit for the data. Critically, the interaction of light-
display type by outcome was not retained, indicating there was no association between 
the two variables. The interaction of age with correct video choice has already been 
explored above. 
 
Finally, with regard to jungle task performance, we examined the effect of age and light-
display-type had on our second outcome measure: correct responses with appropriate 
justifications. A loglinear analysis examined the 3-way interaction of age by light display 
type by correct response with justification and each of the lower order interactions and 
effects. The final model retained the interaction of age-group by outcome only. The 
likelihood ratio of this model was 2 (12) = 11.17, p = .52. The 2-way interaction term of 
light-display-type by correct response with justification was not significant indicating, 
that there was no association between the kind of light display witnessed and success on 
the jungle task. 
 
Possible Reasons For Failure: Not Encoding The Lights And Reversing Onset Orders 
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We considered two prima facie reasons why children should fail the task: failure to notice 
the lights coming on, and confusions of left and right. We give descriptive statistics 
bearing on these concerns.  
 
In the first place, 19% of children made spontaneous reference to the lights coming on, 
and 31% spontaneously pointed to the lights. The large majority of children (86%) 
reported that they had seen them come on when asked. The ones who did not reply 
tended to be generally uncommunicative children. One child said he did not see the lights 
come on, so the sequence was replayed for him. 
 
Thirty-four percent of all responses were errors on the successive conditions (LR or RL). 
See Table 3 for these errors against age. These differences in error type against age fell 
short of significance: 2 (2) = 5.44, p = .066.  Of these errors, 64% were errors of 
choosing the video with the simultaneous lights, rather than reversal errors.  The 
remainder (36%) were indeed reversal errors. Given this pattern, it can be said that 
confusing left and right was not the major source of error even in the youngest children.  
Indeed, in the camera-facing condition (where the observed light order was the opposite 
from the one originally seen) there was the smallest number of reversal errors: 11%, with 
44.5% each on the other two camera positions. 
 
Video Selection Against Chance 
A small percentage of children (7%) said that they did not know when asked to select one 
of the videos. Excluding those, we can examine whether the remaining children in each 
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age group selected the correct video more often than chance (chance is 1/3). Children in 
the young group were no better than chance at selecting the correct video (one-tailed 
binomial test, p = .22). Middle-group children (3.5-4.5) were, however, significantly 
better than chance at selecting the correct video (one-tailed binomial test, p < .01) as were 
children in the oldest group (one-tailed binomial test, p < .01).   
 
Performance On The Ancillary Tasks  
Table 4 provides a summary of children’s performance on the four ancillary tasks of 
second-order theory of mind, Modus Tollens reasoning, perspective-taking and see-
know/guess. These data were used in the analysis. It is notable that correct responding on 
the Modus Tollens task was near ceiling level for even the youngest age group. (The 
perspective-taking and know-guess data are presented the way they are because the data 
were strongly bi-modal.) 
 
The Relation Between Jungle Task Performance And Ancillary Task Performance 
We examined the relationship between children’s performance on the jungle task and the 
ancillary tasks. We used children’s choice of video plus appropriate justifications as the 
performance measure in the jungle task as this is a conservative measure of performance. 
Table 5 presents full and partial correlations between the different measures after 
controlling for age and receptive vocabulary.  This demonstrates that, when age and 
verbal ability were partialled out, only performance on the second-order theory of mind 
task correlated significantly with performance on the jungle task (column 3, lower 
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portion). The other correlations fell well short of significance. To examine this result 
more closely we carried out a logistic regression analysis. 
 
We performed a hierarchical mixed binary logistic regression with performance on the 
jungle task as the dependent measure. A regression analysis models the influence of 
multiple variables on the dependent measure and allows us to predict the probability of 
new participants passing the jungle task. In step-one, age (measured in months) and 
BPVS score were entered into the model. The likelihood ratio test confirmed that the 
model at this stage was a significantly better predictor of the recall in the jungle task than 
the null model, 2 (2) = 32.94, p < .01. (The null model is one in which no predictor 
variables are included and each participant is assigned category membership based on the 
modal outcome, i.e., failing the task). The Wald chi-square statistic indicated that BPVS 
was a significant predictor of the outcome, 2 (1) = 10.85, p < .01. Age alone was, 
however, not a significant predictor of the outcome 2 (1) = 2.61, p = .11. In other words, 
when predicting performance on the jungle task it is no more beneficial to know age if 
verbal ability is known: the effect of age is fully explained in terms of an increase in 
verbal ability. In step two we entered theory of mind, know/guess, perspective taking and 
Modus Tollens reasoning into the model using the backward stepwise likelihood ratio 
method, whereby all variables are entered into the model to begin with and then each 
variable is removed in turn. The variable least likely to predict the outcome was removed 
at each iteration and the model without that variable was compared to the model with that 
variable. If there was no significant difference in the variance predicted by the two 
models then the removed variable is not retained. At each iteration, then, we determined 
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how well the model fitted the observed data. Only second-order theory of mind was 
retained in the final model. The likelihood ratio test confirmed that this model was a 
significant improvement on the model at stage one (when only BPVS and age were 
included): 2 (1) = 4.81, p < .05. The final regression model is presented in Table 6. 
Compared to the null model the final model was a significantly better predictor of 
performance in the jungle task: 2 (3) = 38.39, p < .01. That is, it accounted for a 
significantly greater proportion of the variance on the jungle task than did the null model. 
The Hosmer and Lemeshow test indicated that the final model provided a good overall fit 
for the data: 2 (8) = 7.99, p = .43. In other words, the predicted values of each case 
derived from the model were not significantly different from the observed values. The 
Nagelkerke R Square value associated with this model was .311. This is an analogue of 
the R2 value in linear regression, indicating that almost a third of the variance in 
performance on the jungle game is accounted for by the model. Analysis of the individual 
predictor variables in Table 4 indicates that performance on the BPVS and theory-of-
mind task were the only significant predictors of recall in the jungle task. The positive 
regression coefficient β and an odds ratio of greater than 1 indicates that increases in 
BPVS and theory of mind are associated with increased probability of recall on the jungle 
task; i.e., as scores on BPVS and second-order theory of mind increase so too does 
performance on the jungle task. 
 
DISCUSSION  
Two clear results have emerged from this study.  First, children above 4-and-a-half are 
likely to succeed on a task in which they have to infer their presence in a past 
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spatiotemporal context from video evidence. Second, while a grasp of the see-know 
relationship, skill at spatial perspective-taking, and Modus Tollens reasoning  were not 
related to performance on the jungle memory task, second-order theory-of-mind 
performance was indeed related. Less centrally, we have broadly replicated the results of 
earlier studies on Modus Tollens understanding, spatial perspective-taking, seeing-leads-
to-knowing, and second-order theory of mind in children of within this age range. 
 
The Significance Of Success After Four-And-A-Half Years 
In the first place, the age at which performance on video selection rose above chance in 
the jungle task is not markedly different from the age at which children succeed on other 
“conceptual” (see Introduction) tests of episodic memory using free recall (Perner and 
Ruffman, 1995), direct-versus-indirect experience (Perner et al, 2007), and the spoon-test 
methodology (Scarf et al, 2013). It is likely, then, that requiring children explicitly to 
represent themselves in the past in an episodic memory task makes no significant 
cognitive demands additional to those recruited by these other conceptual episodic tasks. 
This is consistent with the view that this is something that they do naturally when 
presented with the other episodic tasks. Second, research by Povinelli, alluded to in the 
Introduction, tends to suggest that the children in our sample were unlikely to have been 
impeded by an inability to relate the self-in-video to present, remembering-self. Children 
of 4 can appreciate the continuity between video-self and current self (Povinelli, Landau 
& Perilloux, 1996).  While even children of 3 years show verbal recognition of 
themselves in videos (often referring to themselves in the third person); though it will be 
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another year or two before they can understand the causal linkage between the past, 
videoed configuration of the world and the current one (Povinelli et al, 1999).  
 
The Role Of Second-Order Tom 
Can one conclude from these data that second-order theory of mind (the embedding of 
“know” within “think” in this case) is implicated in the child’s developing ability 
explicitly to place herself in a past spatiotemporal context as an experiencer?  It might be 
objected that we found the result we did because the task was designed to require second-
order cognition, at least in the camera-above and camera-facing conditions, implying that 
such a relationship is not surprising and that it has no useful implications for the 
normative development of episodic memory. There are two replies to this point. In the 
first place, to find a significant correlation (after age and verbal ability have been 
controlled for) between a task that requires the embedding of one mental orientation 
within another and one that requires working out the identity of a filmed agent from 
spatiotemporal cues is hardly trivial.  The tasks are markedly different.  Second, and 
more centrally, the camera-above and the camera-facing conditions were necessary 
inclusions, as we have indicated, because in the camera-behind condition, when child and 
camera shared a perspective, it was possible for the child to be correct simply by virtue of 
the video showing a familiar scene. It was not necessary for the child to have any grasp 
of the fact that her location in a past spatiotemporal context determined a certain kind of 
experience.  
 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [K
ing
's 
Co
lle
ge
 L
on
do
n]
 at
 03
:13
 06
 A
pr
il 2
01
6 
  
31 
However, if the camera-above and camera-facing conditions required a more demanding 
strategy from the children, why did we not find a significant difference in performance 
between the three camera-placement conditions (see Table 1)? Why was the camera-
behind condition not easier than the other two conditions?  A strong possibility is that the 
successful children were not, in fact, performing in the camera-behind condition on the 
basis of familiarity alone, but by a form of second-order cognition of the kind “Am I 
seeing the view representing the representation of the lights that I had yesterday.” In 
other words, the result demonstrates the emergence of a mature form of episodic 
memory. 
 
Perspective-Taking In Performance On The ‘Camera-Facing’ And ‘Camera-Above’ 
Conditions 
The discussion in the previous section carries the assumption that in the camera-above, 
and especially in the camera-facing conditions, successful children engaged in a kind of 
transformation of egocentric perspectives. It must be born in mind, however, that the 
room also contained allocentric cues such as windows, doors, plants, and toy animals.  
Accordingly, a child in conditions other than the camera-behind one could plausibly 
represent something like “the first tree lighting up was next to the flamingo” (see Figure 
2). This possibility does not, however, vitiate the claim that in the camera-above and 
camera-behind conditions the successful children could have been engaging in second-
order representation. For example, such a child would still have to do the following in the 
(say) camera-facing condition: “I am seeing/representing the flamingo-light-first 
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representation (1), which would also have been represented (2) by the hidden child.”  
This role of this “transformation of egocentric perspectives” will be discussed again later. 
 
The Relation To The Metarepresentational Theory Of Episodic Memory 
How do these data relate to Perner’s (2001) claim that conceptual episodic memory 
depends upon what is essentially a first- (not second-) order understanding? Essentially, 
on Perner’s view, two forms of understanding have to be in place for episodic memory: 
(1) understanding what it means for something to be representation of a state of affairs 
(this may not be mental, and may be pictorial: Perner, 1991), (2) understanding that 
experiences at time-1 can cause memories at time-2. On our view, however, there is an 
additional representational step, which is representing the representational states of 
oneself at time-1. 
 
It may be objected to the current position that perhaps our study, in virtue of the 
additional demands of the camera-above and the camera-facing condition, added a 
representation step that need not be present in the normal case. Indeed a sceptic might say 
that the whole notion of binding “past-self” to past spatiotemporal contexts is somewhat 
overblown?  After all, to whom would the child bind these experiences if not to herself? 
To answer this criticism one must take account of the fact that episodic memory is (a) 
from a point of view and (b) includes the bodily location of the subject.  These two things 
will be true of it if indeed the rememberer is including herself in the representation as a 
physically-present witness.  The first-order account omits (a) and (b) insofar as it is 
possible for one to take oneself to be enjoying a re-experiential memory of a scene 
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without the added appreciation that (say) X was experienced on the left because of one’s 
spatial location in relation to X and other objects. To quote Hoerl again (2001, p. 333) 
“the causal understanding involved in episodic memory consists in a grasp of certain 
spatiotemporal constraints on remembering, that is, of the fact that we must have been 
around to witness an event before we can remember it…This kind of causal 
understanding may be quite distinct from the ability to think of the causal relations one’s 
mental states stand to each other.” Given this, it is not enough to refer to mental-state-at-
time-one causing mental-state-at-time-two. One has to refer also to the past location of 
the experiencing body, something that was required, albeit not consistently, in the jungle 
task. 
 
The “Transformation Of Egocentric Perspectives:” Neuroscientific Implications. 
The phrase “transformation of egocentric perspectives” was used in the section before 
last to describe what children were being called upon to do, most clearly in the camera-
above and the camera-facing conditions. That is to say, in these two conditions the child 
not only had to operate with an allocentric representation of the display (e.g., child-who-
may-be-me between the two towers) but had mentally to compare this to their previously 
viewed  “egocentric” perspective on the layout that the cameras afforded as well as the 
crucial step of working out the egocentric perspective of the child between the towers 
(hence the second-order nature of the task). In other words, this was a task that required 
the integration of allocentric and egocentric information.   
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In light of this is it worth noting that much of the recent neuroscientific and neural-
network modelling of episodic memory (e.g., Burgess et al, 2001; Lambrey et al 2012) 
has been focussed upon the connectivity and mutual dependency between the 
hippocampus (broadly responsible for allocentric spatial coding) and the medial parietal 
region (broadly responsible for egocentric spatial coding).  Given this, it may be fruitful 
in this context to bridge the neuroscience and the cognitive-developmental psychology of 
episodic memory in the following way.  The kind of early episodic memory tapped by 
studies such as those by Burns et al (2014) and by Newcombe et al (2014) is of a kind 
recruiting the hippocampus, insofar as the essential requirement in their tasks was to 
locate past events within an objective, allocentric framework (e.g., an action near a room 
landmark, in Burns et al; a toy in a certain container in Newcombe et al). Allocentric 
spatial facts had to be bound to temporal and semantic facts, but with no requirement to 
locate oneself as a viewing body within the scene.  In the present study, however, while 
the kind of spatiotemporal coding just described did indeed have to be employed so too 
did a conception of the self in the past with a point-of-view. It is the parietal region rather 
than the hippocampus that appears to be implicated in this perspectival form of memory 
(Burgess et al, 2001). 
 
The involvement of the parietal region in perspectival memory would seem to offer a 
neuroscientific explanation, complementing and not replacing a purely psychological 
one, for why we found an association between perspectival memory and theory-of-mind 
abilities.  The medial parietal region (temporal-parietal junction) is known to be 
implicated in performance on theory-of-mind tasks such as false belief (e.g., Saxe and 
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Kanswisher, 2003). Additionally, as described in a meta-analysis by Perner and 
colleagues (Schurz et al, 2013) there is found to be common activation for false-belief 
reasoning and visual perspective taking in the left (though not the right) dorsal temporo-
parietal junction. 
 
Summing Up 
We have shown that children above four-and-a-half become able to recollect and locate 
themselves within a past videoed scene on the basis of spatiotemporal cues. Moreover, 
they seem to do this not on the basis of familiarity, but by co-ordinating the point-of-view 
of the camera with their original point-of-view. Second, we extend and elaborate on Josef 
Perner’s insight that the kind of episodic memory abilities emerging around four years 
depend upon theory-of-mind abilities, while differing from Perner on the precise nature 
of the latter. Finally, for reasons just outlined, it is more than mere speculation to say that 
maturation of the medial parietal region may underlie both the theory-of-mind abilities 
and the kind of perspectival episodic recollection tapped in this study. 
 
APPENDIX 
A selection of justifications given by the children for choosing a particular video. 
 
“Because that light came on first and then that light came on” 
“Because they all came on together” 
“Because both lights came on at the same time” 
“Because the lights flashed like that” 
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“Because I memorized which light came on first” 
“Because that one came on first” 
“Because the lights came on together” 
“Because it was that one then that one” 
“Because it did in ours” 
“Because our lights went on after each other” 
“Because they flashed together like this” 
“Because I remembered which light came on first” 
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Table 1. Percentage of correct video choice by age-group and camera position (correct 
choices with appropriate justification in parenthesis). 
 3.5-4.5 4.5-5.5 5.5-6.5 Overall 
Behind 18% (18%) 53% (41%) 77% (65%) 49% (41%) 
Facing 29% (12%) 59% (41%) 47% (29%) 45% (27%) 
Above 29% (12%) 41% (24%) 65% (65%) 45% (33%) 
Overall 25% (14%) 51% (33%) 63% (53%) 46% (33%) 
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Table 2.  Percentage of correct video choice by age group and light order (correct choices 
with appropriate justifications in parenthesis). 
 3.5-4.5 4.5-5.5 5.5-6.5 Overall 
L-R 30% (15%) 60% (40%) 39% (33%) 43% (30%) 
Simultaneous 24% (18%) 60% (45%) 81% (69%) 55% (43%) 
R-L 24% (10%) 31% (19%) 71% (59%) 41% (28%) 
Overall 25% (14%) 51% (33%) 63% (53%) 46% (33%) 
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Table 3. This shows the distribution of reversal (bold) to simultaneous errors for children 
by age-group on the successive conditions. 
Age group Reversal errors vs. simultaneous errors 
Young 10 – 12 
Middle 7 – 8 
Old 2 - 14 
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Table 4. Percentage pass rates for theory of mind, Modus Tollens, perspective-taking and 
know/guess. 
Age Group (n = 51 per 
group) 
ToM  Modus 
Tollens  
Perspective-
Taking 
Know/Guess 
0-2 3-4 0-1 1.5-2 
3.5-4.5 29 86 61 39 84 16 
4.5-5.5 51 86 55 45 64 36 
5.5-6.5 84 98 12 88 8 92 
Overall 54 90 47 53 53 47 
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Table 5. Raw correlations (above diagonal) and partial correlations controlling for age 
and BPVS score  (below diagonal). 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 
1. Age - .59** .35** .25** .64** .38** .21* 
2. BPVS  - .43** .18* .43** .25** .3** 
3. Jungle Task   - .18* .26** .21** .15 
4. ToM    .18* - .43** .18* -.19* 
5. Know/guess   .03 .16* - .36** .28** 
6. Perspective   .09 .27** .17* - .22** 
7. Modus T.   .02 .09 .19* .14 - 
Note: * = significant at the .05 level; ** = significant at the .01 level. 
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Table 6. Final logistic regression model with performance on the jungle task (pass, fail) 
as the dependent variable and age (months), BPVS (raw score) and second-order theory 
of mind (pass, fail) the predictor variables. 
 Β SE β Wald’s 2 df p e β (odds ratio) 
Constant -5.14 1.19 18.68 1 .00 .01 
Age .02 .02 1.18 1 .28 1.02 
BPVS .04 .02 6.24 1 .01 1.04 
Theory of Mind 1.1 .48 5.25 1 .02 2.98 
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Figure 1. Layout of the “jungle” room 
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Figure 2. A view of the “jungle” room 
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